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  We illustrate the experimental method by examining bidding behavior for controversial goods, 
i.e., goods in which bidders have positive and negative values. Our results suggest that bidding 
behavior differs across auction type. Bidders with positive induced values bid sincerely in a 
WTP auction. Bidders bid conservatively, however, in the WTA auction, foregoing profitable 
opportunities. Informing bidders of their optimal strategy serves to attenuate bidding discre-
pancies but does not eliminate them. Treating the WTP and WTA auctions as equivalent given 
positive and negative values could lead one to overstate the costs relative to the benefits of the 
controversial good. 
 




In 1992, the Northeastern Agricultural and Re-
source Economics Association (NAREA) invited 
Jason Shogren to make a case for experimental 
methods and for why more researchers might con-
sider using the approach to study questions in 
environmental and natural resource economics 
(see Shogren 1993). At the time, a few resource 
economists used experimental methods to ex-
amine the behavioral underpinnings of environ-
mental policy. The few experiments that existed 
focused primarily on stated preference valuation 
work; they were designed to try to understand 
how people stated values given alternative prefe-
rence elicitation devices (see Cummings, Brook-
shire, and Schulze 1986). Shogren’s experience 
was likewise limited. But in graduate school in 
Wyoming in the mid-1980s Shogren witnessed 
Professors Bill Schulze, David Brookshire, Don 
Coursey, and Betsy Hoffman use experimental 
economics as a legitimate tool. Charlie Plott also 
visited Wyoming several times. He convinced 
Shogren completely why the method was valid 
and why it mattered—experiments could crack 
open ideas too tangled with institutional rules for 
theory alone. Finally, a year studying with Peter 
Bohm in Stockholm taught Shogren an apprecia-
tion of the nuances between control and context. 
These scholars did not seem to consider them-
selves “experimental economists” per se, but rather 
as economists interested in experiments. Ener-
gized by their commitment and spurred by their 
encouragement, Shogren came to prefer the experi-
mental method and mindset as a method of 
analysis. 
  Seventeen years later, in 2009, NAREA again 
extended an invitation to Shogren, this time to 
revisit how the experimental method contributes 
to environmental and resource economics. What a 
difference a few decades makes. While doubts 
persist, today most environmental and resource 
economists have judged that experiments can be a 
valid and useful tool. They either run experiments 
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themselves, support graduate and undergraduate 
courses in experimental methods, encourage grant 
funding based on experimental treatments, or at a 
minimum do not discourage young researchers 
from entering into the lab and field. Many entic-
ing themes have emerged over the last decade—
behavioral economics challenging the dominion 
of rational choice theory, academic debates over 
laboratory versus field versus virtual versus neu-
roeconomic experiments, and a movement toward 
serious test-bedding of environmental and agri-
cultural policy. For recent work using experi-
ments to explore environmental and natural re-
source economics, see, for instance, the two doz-
en chapters and discussion in Cherry, Kroll, and 
Shogren (2008). 
  One key ingredient has remained constant over 
the past two decades—the experimental mindset. 
The experimental mindset is the passion to ob-
serve real people making economic choices with-
in alternative institutions invented or replicated 
by the researcher. The mindset is what matters 
most, not where it is applied—i.e., the lab versus 
field ultimately is a red herring. Researchers de-
sign the allocation and cost rules of the exchange 
institution, the game theoretic structure, or the 
isolated decision. They strive to control the envi-
ronment to the degree they can in order to test 
theory, recognize patterns, and design mechanisms. 
Since no “people vacuum” exists, balancing con-
trol versus context will always be a struggle and a 
constant inspiration for newcomers. 
  Herein we provide one example of our recent 
work on using experimental economics to explore 
the behavior underpinnings of environmental 
policy. We focus on experimental auctions to 
elicit values for controversial goods—i.e., goods 
in which a population can have both positive and 
negative values—e.g., wolf reintroduction or ge-
netically modified foods. We consider within- 
sample comparisons of bidding behavior in Vick-
rey willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness 
to pay (WTP) auctions given that both positive 
and negative induced values exist. In both auction 
settings, a negative induced value represents a 
diminution in welfare (or a cost), and a positive 
induced value represents a welfare improvement 
(or a benefit). Within-sample comparisons be-
tween the WTA and WTP auctions suggest that 
demand-revealing bidding occurs in the WTP 
auction when people have positive values. But for 
negative values in the WTP auction and for all 
values in the WTA auction, bidding behavior is 
widely dispersed and inconsistent with demand 
revelation. These results hold whether subjects 
are uninformed or informed of the optimal bid-
ding strategy, although bidding behavior does 
move closer to predicted bidding behavior for 




Experimental auctions have become a popular 
method to elicit individuals’ private values for 
changes in private and public goods (see Lusk 
and Shogren 2007). Auctions typically elicit ei-
ther willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to 
accept (WTA) measures of value, depending on 
the property rights of the good. If people hold 
property rights, we use a WTA auction; other-
wise, we use a WTA auction. The common ap-
proach for assigning property rights in experi-
mental auctions is to endow people with an infe-
rior good and ask them their WTP to trade up to a 
superior good, or to endow them with the superior 
good and then ask their WTA to trade down.
1 The 
assignment of the goods as superior or inferior is 
done a priori and ordered according to the social 
norm.
2 
  But for controversial goods like irradiation, ge-
netic modification, wolf reintroduction, and water 
quality improvements, values will differ—some 
positive, others negative.
3 Both positive and nega-
tive values could arise in either auction, WTP or 
WTA. The open question is: Does bidding behav-
ior in a Vickrey-style WTA auction parallel bid-
ding behavior in a Vickrey-style WTP auction 
when bidders have both positive and negative in-
duced values? 
                                                                                    
1 Corrigan and Rousu (2006) have shown that endowing people with a 
good may create an obligation within the subjects that causes them to 
overbid their true values in an effort to repay the experimenter. In our 
experiment subjects are endowed with an induced value, which has no 
intrinsic value unless they win the auction and which avoids creating 
the reciprocity value posited by Corrigan and Rousu (2006). 
2 For example, because irradiated chicken reduces the risk of illness-
causing food-borne pathogens, a sandwich made using irradiated chicken 
is thought to be an improvement over the identical sandwich made 
using non-irradiated chicken, and, as such, a WTP auction is employed 
(see Fox, Hayes, and Shogren 2002). 
3 Parkhurst, Shogren, and Dickinson (2004), for example, examined 
the influence of negative values on bidding behavior in WTP Vickrey 
auctions. They observe in a 2nd-price WTP auction that bids were 
biased upwards for both positive and negative values; in a random nth-
price auction, bids were sincere on average, but strategic bidding was 
observed. Shogren, Parkhurst, and Hudson  Experimental Economics and the Environment   135 
 
 
  One might think that within a Vickrey incen-
tive-compatible auction the answer is “yes.” Se-
parating what a person says from what he pays 
makes telling the truth the weakly dominant strat-
egy (Vickrey 1961), regardless of the type of 
auction—WTA or WTP. Lab experiments pro-
vide evidence indicating that demand revelation 
for a WTA mechanism is similar to a WTP mech-
anism when subjects are given positive induced 
values in the WTP auction and positive induced 
costs in the WTA auction (Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler 1990, Irwin et al. 1998, Noussair, 
Robin, and Ruffieux 2004). We test whether these 
findings are robust in an incentive-compatible 
demand-revealing auction in which both positive 




We use positive and negative induced values to 
examine bidding behavior in a Vickrey-style auc-
tion. We use a uniform 4th-price auction to en-
gage more bidders.
4 Because we have both posi-
tive and negative induced values in each auction, 
we maintain consistency in the design such that 
the monitor buys back the good in both auc-
tions—i.e., an induced value equal to $4.00 would 
pay a winning bidder $4.00 in either auction.
5 We 
use an AB (BA) design, in which subjects bid 
first in 10 WTP auction rounds and then 10 WTA 
auction rounds, or vice versa. The AB design al-
lows for within-sample comparisons, while con-
trolling for learning effects. Two AB sessions and 
two BA sessions are conducted for each of two 
treatments—(i) subjects uninformed of the op-
timal strategy, and (ii) subjects informed of the 
optimal strategy—for a total of 8 sessions. Each 
session had 10 subjects (80 subjects in total), with 
each subject participating in 20 rounds. Subjects 
                                                                                    
4 Tradeoffs in engaging bidders exist across kth-price uniform auc-
tions (see Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler 2001, and Shogren et al. 2001). 
Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler (2001) show that WTA increases and WTP 
decreases when 10 bidders are engaged in a 9th-price auction relative to 
a 2nd-price auction. A possible explanation for this divergence could be 
the ability of people to tacitly collude as the number of winners be-
comes large relative to the number of participants. The results from our 
4th-price WTP auction parallel those observed in the literature for 2nd-
price auctions (see Parkhurst, Shogren, and Dickinson 2004, Kagel 
1995). 
5 For a cleaner comparison between auction mechanisms, subjects 
were presented with induced values in both auction mechanisms in 
which the induced value specifies the individual’s resale value in both 
cases. 
were recruited following standard procedures 
from undergraduate economics courses. 
  The experiment design for the WTA auction 
followed a nine-step process:
6 
 
 Step  1. Each bidder received a value sheet that 
had his private resale value for the round. The 
bidder’s resale value is the price the monitor 
would pay to the bidder if he or she won the 
auction. We replicate and combine two sets, A 
and B, of private values used in Parkhurst, Sho-
gren, and Dickinson (2004), which gives us 8 dif-
ferent negative values and 10 different positive 
values. Two induced values, $1.30 and $2.90, 
were replicated, with each bidder having each of 
the two values—once in the WTP auction, and 
once in the WTA auction.
7 
  In the WTA auction, a negative value is illu-
strative of the marginal cost of production, and a 
positive value indicates that the person could re-
linquish the good and still receive positive private 
benefit.
8 Induced values were randomly assigned 
in each round with no two bidders having the 
same induced value within a round. Each bidder 
had a personal and private record sheet to main-
tain, which created a history of past induced val-
ues, bids, profits, and the market-clearing com-
pensation for previous rounds. 
 
 Step  2. The rules of the auction mechanism 
were introduced to the bidders. For the uniform 
4th-price WTA auction, subjects were told that 
the three people with the lowest bids would each 
acquire one unit of the good and be paid the 
market compensation equal to the fourth-lowest 
bid. Subjects were told they could bid any 
value—positive or negative—they chose. Each 
bidder then submitted a private bid to acquire one 
unit of the good. In the informed treatment, sub-
                                                                                    
6 Experimental instructions are available from the authors upon 
request. 
7 Set A: [-4.7, -3.9, -2.8, -1.5, -1.0, 0.2, 1.3, 2.6, 2.9, 3.9]. Set B: [-4.8, 
-4.4, -1.3, 0.8, 1.3, 1.4, 2.9, 3.1, 3.2, 4.4]. Using the same set of values 
across rounds creates a focal point on market compensation (price) that 
provides on-margin, off-margin information to subjects. Subjects on-
margin then bid sincerely, while subjects off-margin bid insincerely. 
But we would expect strategic behavior to be consistent across auction 
types. This paper examines whether the two auction mechanisms are 
truly consistent. 
8 Examples of people relinquishing a good and receiving a positive 
private benefit are abundant. These include habitat preservation where 
the individual has a private conservation value that exceeds the devel-
oped value of the land, or restoration of wetlands where the value of 
hunting leases may exceed the foregone value of production. 136    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
jects were informed of their dominant strategy 
and were provided illustrative examples. 
 
 Step  3. The monitor ranked the bids from low-
est to highest. 
 
 Step  4. The fourth-lowest bid set the market-
clearing compensation. 
 
 Step  5. The monitor posted the market-clearing 
compensation as public information. 
 
 Step  6. The three lowest bidders each acquired 
one unit of the good at the market compensation. 
 
 Step  7. The three lowest bidders then sold the 
unit back to the monitor at his or her assigned 
resale value for that auction. The bidder’s profits 
equaled the sum of his or her resale value and the 
market compensation for that round: profits = 
resale value + market compensation. Subjects were 
informed that they could have negative profits, 
and profit calculations were verified. 
 
 Step  8. All bidders at or above the market com-
pensation did not acquire the good and recorded 
profits equal to zero. 
 
 Step  9. The round ended and the bidders re-
turned to Step 1. 
 
  In the WTP auction, the steps were identical 
except the process was inverted. Now, bids were 
ranked from highest to lowest, with the fourth 
highest bid determining the market-clearing price 
and the three highest bidders each buying one unit 
of the good. The profit function also changed, and 
now profits were equal to the difference between 





In the WTP auction, the optimal strategy is for a 
bidder to bid his induced value: Bid
*
WTP= induced 
value. A bidder who bids in excess of his induced 
value risks earning negative profits; negative prof-
its are realized if the market price falls between 
his bid and his induced value. A bidder who un-
derbids foregoes profitable opportunities. 
  In the WTA auction, the optimal strategy is for 
a subject to bid (-1) times his induced value: 
Bid
*
WTA  = (-1) ×  induced value. Recall that a 
negative value is a welfare diminution (or a cost), 
so bidding the optimal strategy in the WTA 
auction implies that to incur the reduction in wel-
fare associated with his negative induced value, 
the subject must be compensated a positive amount 
of equal absolute magnitude. The consequences 
of underbidding and overbidding in the WTA 
auction are opposite those of the WTP auction. In 
the WTA auction, overbidding risks foregoing 
profitable opportunities; whereas in underbidding 
his optimal WTA strategy, the subject risks earn-
ing negative profits. 
  For simplicity, define bidding aggressively as 
bidding that results in the subjects risking nega-
tive profits (overbidding in the WTP and under-
bidding in the WTA). Alternatively, define bid-
ding conservatively as when bidders risk fore-
going profitable opportunities (underbidding in 
the WTP and overbidding in the WTA). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We present the results in three phases: (i) bench-
mark WTP bidding, (ii) WTA bidding relative to 
auction theory, (iii) bidding across the WTA and 
WTP auctions, and (iv) bidding behavior when 
bidders know the optimal strategy relative to un-
informed bidders in the WTA and WTP auctions. 
 
  Phase 1: Benchmark behavior in the WTP auc-
tion. First, consider bidding behavior in the WTP 
auction. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. 
The median and modes are almost always at the 
predicted values. We test three hypotheses: 
 
HYPOTHESIS H1A. Bidding behavior is demand-re-
vealing over positive induced values in the WTP 
auction. 
 
HYPOTHESIS H1B. Bidding behavior is demand-re-
vealing over negative induced values in the WTP 
auction. 
 
HYPOTHESIS H1C. In the WTP auction, subjects’ bid-
ding behavior does not differ when the subjects’ 
induced value is negative relative to positive. 
 




it i it it
it it i t it
Bid IN NEG
NEG IN u
= α+ φ + β
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Bidding Behavior—WTP Auction 
























































































































































































Note: Uninformed descriptive statistics are on the top, informed are on the bottom.
  
* Mean deviation from optimal bid equals bid minus induced value. 
†† Sample size was 40 for these induced values, 20 otherwise. 
 
where Bidit denotes subject i’s bid in trial t; INit 
denotes subject i’s induced value in trial t; u i 
represents subject-specific characteristics; ϕt re-
presents trial-specific effects, including learning 
or other trends in bidding behavior; and εit is the 
iid error. NEGit is a dummy variable, which 
equals one when bidder i has a negative value in 
round t, and equals zero otherwise. NEGit allows 
the intercept term to adjust for bids on negative 
values.  NEGit  ×  INit is an interaction term that 
allows the slope of the regression line to vary be-
tween positive and negative values. We test bid-
der behavior as follows: In equation (1), H1A 
implies that if α = 0, and φ = 1, then the bidder’s 138    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
behavior is demand-revealing over positive val-
ues. For H1B, if α + β1 = 0, and φ + β2 = 1, then 
bidding behavior is demand-revealing over nega-
tive induced values. For H1C, if β1 = β2 = 0, then 
aggregate bidding behavior does not differ across 
positive and negative induced values. 




           Bidit = 0.38 + 0.99INit – 0.32NEGit  
                            (0.35)    (0.09)           (0.42) 
                   – 0.48 (NEGit × INit). 
                           (0.14) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. For positive 
induced values, the intercept is 0.38, but not 
statistically different from zero, and the slope of 
the bid line is 0.99. Using a Wald test, we fail to 
reject the joint hypothesis of H1A; people bid 
sincerely in the aggregate for positive induced 
values (p-value = 0.42). Turning to negative in-
duced values, we observe that the intercept is 
close to expectation, α + β1 = 0.06, but that the 
slope is flatter than unitary, φ + β2 = 0.51. Testing 
the joint hypothesis of H1B, we reject the null of 
sincere bidding for negative induced values at the 
1 percent significance level (p-value = 0.002). 
Lastly, we reject H1C at the 1 percent signifi-
cance level (p-value = 0.001)—bidding behavior 
differed between positive and negative values. In 
summary, people bid differently for negative val-
ues relative to positive values, with peoples’ bids 
being demand-revealing for positive induced val-




  Phase 2: Behavior in the WTA auction. Table 2 
summarizes the central tendencies and standard 
deviations of observed bidding behavior in the 
WTA auction by induced value. For the WTA 
auction, we test three hypotheses: 
 
                                                                                    
9 A Hausman test supports the use of two-way random effects over 
two-way fixed effects (p-value = 0.50). 
10 As a benchmark, bidding behavior here in the uniform 4th-price 
auction resembles the bidding behavior of the 2nd-price auction in Park-
hurst, Shogren, and Dickinson (2004): 
  
Bidit = -0.25 + 1.14INit – 0.08NEGit – 0.31 (NEGit × INit), 
                   (0.41)  (0.10)      (0.41)          (0.14)  
 
where subjects overbid both positive and negative induced values. 
HYPOTHESIS H2A. Bidding behavior is demand-re-
vealing over positive induced values in the WTA 
auction. 
 
HYPOTHESIS H2B. Bidding behavior is demand-re-
vealing over negative induced values in the WTA 
auction. 
 
HYPOTHESIS H2C. Subjects’ bidding behavior does 
not differ when their induced value is negative rela-
tive to positive in the WTA auction. 
 
Recall that in the WTA auction, a bidder’s op-
timal strategy is to bid -1 times his induced value. 
If a subject bids conservatively—overbids his op-
timal strategy (e.g., bids $-1.00 when his induced 
value is $2.00)—he foregoes opportunities to 
make positive profits if the market compensation 
falls between his bid and his optimal strategy. If 
he bids aggressively—underbids his optimal strat-
egy (e.g., bids $-3.00 when his induced value is 
$2.00)—he runs the risk of negative profits if the 
market compensation falls between his bid and 
his optimal strategy. Failing to reject H2A (or 
H2B) implies that a person’s bid was [(-1) × in-
duced value] for positive (negative) induced val-
ues. We test H2A, H2B, and H2C by estimating 
equation (1) for the bids of uninformed subjects 
in the WTA auction. 
  We test bidder behavior as follows: from the 
estimated regression equation, H2A implies that if 
α = 0, and φ = -1, then the bidder’s behavior is 
demand-revealing over positive values. For H2B, 
if α + β1 = 0, and φ + β2 = -1, then the bidder’s 
behavior is demand-revealing over negative in-
duced values. Finally, for H2C, if β1 = β2 = 0, 
then a bidder’s behavior in the WTA auction does 
not differ across positive and negative  induced 
values. 
  Assuming two-way random effects,
11 the esti-
mated equation is 
 
   Bidit = -0.06 + 0.03INit + 0.84NEGit 
                              (0.41)    (0.13)            (0.57), 
                       – 0.37(NEGit × INit), 
                                (0.18) 
 
where standard errors are in parentheses. For 
positive induced values, we observe that the inter-
cept term is not statistically different from zero 
                                                                                    
11 The random effects model is supported by the Hausman test, p-
value = 0.27. Shogren, Parkhurst, and Hudson  Experimental Economics and the Environment   139 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics on Bidding Behavior—WTA Auction 




























































































































































































































Note: Uninformed descriptive statistics are on the top, informed are on the bottom. 
* Mean deviation from optimal bid equals bid plus induced value. 
†† Sample size was 40 for these induced values, 20 otherwise. 
 
 
(p-value = 0.27), nor is the slope (0.03) statis-
tically different from zero (p-value = 0.80). We 
reject the joint hypothesis (H2A) of zero intercept 
and slope equal to -1 for positive induced values 
at the 1 percent significance level (p-value < 
0.001). Bidding behavior over positive induced 140    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
values deviates from the dominant strategy—sub-
jects appear to be bidding conservatively by trun-
cating their bids at zero. 
  Turning now to negative induced values, from 
the regression results we see an intercept of 0.78 
(= α + β1) and slope of -0.34 (= φ + β2 ). The 
WTA bid line for negative induced values shows 
that individuals bid their negative induced values 
aggressively (underbid their optimal strategies). 
The tendency to bid negative induced values ag-
gressively may be a result of off-margin bidders 
moving towards the market compensation in an 
attempt to become engaged in the auction. We 
reject H2B at the 1 percent significance level—
bidding behavior over negative induced values in 
the WTA auction is not demand-revealing. Turn-
ing now to H2C, we compare bidding behavior 
across positive and negative values in the WTA 
auction. Using a Wald test statistic to test the joint 
hypothesis that β1 = β2 = 0, we reject the joint 
hypothesis at the 2 percent significance level. 
Bidding behavior is statistically different when 
subjects possess negative as opposed to positive 
induced values in the WTA auction. 
  Examining the regression results from the unin-
formed WTA sample, we see that bids were more 
consistent with the theoretical prediction for nega-
tive values relative to positive values. This is sur-
prising given that bidders with negative values 
were theoretically projected to submit the highest 
bids
12—off-margin. Bidders with positive values 
should have submitted the lowest bids, and should 
have been the winners and market-clearing com-
pensation setters. Past research has shown that 
on-margin bidders match up with theoretical pre-
dictions in incentive-compatible Vickrey-style 
auctions, whereas off-margin bidders tend to bid 
aggressively (see Shogren et al. 2001). Here, how-
ever, we observe on-margin WTA bidders bid-
ding conservatively (overbidding), while off-mar-




                                                                                    
12 The optimal strategy was to bid (-1) × induced value. Those with 
negative values were expected to bid the positive value equal to the 
negative induced value. If they followed this strategy, they would have 
expressed the highest value bids and been off-margin. 
13 In the WTA auction, lowest bids win, implying that the lower an 
individual’s bid, the more likely is the individual to be engaged in the 
auction. As such, underbidding off-margin bids in the WTA auction is 
consistent with off-margin bidders overbidding in the WTP auctions. 
  Phase 3: WTA vs. WTP auction. Now consider 
whether bidding behavior differed in the WTP 
and WTA auctions. Table 3 presents the mean 
bids and deviations from optimal bidding strate-
gies by auction type grouped by positive and neg-
ative induced values. Recall that the optimal strat-
egies indicate that mean bids should be the same 
magnitude but with opposite signs. We focus on 
the deviations from optimal strategies to help 
illustrate bidding behavior. 
  Table 3 shows that, in the aggregate, people 
overbid their induced values by $0.92 in the WTA 
auctions and by $0.84 in the WTP auctions. As-
suming unequal variances and using a two-sample 
t-test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
aggregate deviations from optimal bids were the 
same in the two auction mechanisms. Restricting 
observations to negative induced values (mean 
deviation $-1.19 in the WTA auction and $1.50 in 
the WTP auction), we reject the null hypothesis at 
the 1 percent significance level. Likewise, for 
deviations from optimal strategies for positive 
values (mean deviation $2.33 in the WTA auction 
and $0.40 in the WTP auction), we reject the null 
hypothesis at the 1 percent significance level. 
  These results suggest that “deviations” in bid-
ding behavior (while on average the same) differ 
for positive and negative values. For positive val-
ues, people overbid in both the WTA and WTP 
auctions; overbidding was about 6 times greater 
in the WTA auction (see Table 4).
14 Recall that 
overbidding positive values has different implica-
tions depending on the auction type. In the WTP 
auction, overbidding positive values runs the risk 
of negative profits (people bid aggressively, per-
haps in an attempt to increase their likelihood of 
winning the auction), whereas overbidding posi-
tive values in the WTA auction results in fore-
gone profitable opportunities (people bid conser-
vatively, reducing their likelihood of winning the 
auction). For negative values, a different bidding 
pattern emerges—people underbid in the WTA 
auction, while they overbid in the WTP auction 
(see Table 4). However, the ultimate risk to nega-
tive-value bidders is similar in both auction types. 
Underbidding in the WTA auction exposes the 
bidder to negative profits; likewise, overbidding 
in the WTP auction also exposes him to negative 
profits (in both auctions subjects bid aggressively 
                                                                                    
14 Deviations from optimal strategies are significantly different at the 
5 percent level for 16 of 18 induced values. Shogren, Parkhurst, and Hudson  Experimental Economics and the Environment   141 
 
 
Table 3. Positive and Negative Induced Value Deviations (bid minus optimal strategy) 
    WTA Auction  WTP Auction 
Two Sample t-test 
Unequal Variance 
Dev(WTP) = Dev(WTA) 
Positive 
induced values 












t = -12.34 
p < 0.001  
Negative 
induced values 












t = 11.94 
p < 0.001 
Aggregate 












t = -0.42 
p = 0.68 
Notes: Bid* indicates the optimal bid. Each cell gives mean on the top line with S.D. in parentheses, mean deviations from opti-
mal strategies on the middle line with S.D. in parentheses, and then the mean absolute deviations from optimal strategies on the 
bottom line with S.D. in parentheses. A t-test comparing positive WTP deviations from negative WTA deviations yields t = 8.42, 




over negative values—taking on the risk of nega-
tive profits in an effort to become engaged in the 
auction). Seemingly, our average bidder was 
willing to take that risk. 
  We confirm these observations with conditional 
analysis. To allow for comparisons across auction 
types, we transform the bid-induced value data by 
using the profit function from each of the auction 
mechanisms. Let δ represent the value function; 
using the profit functions from the two auctions, 




Induced Value   Bid, WTP
,





such that if a person bids optimally, then δ = 0. 
  We test the hypothesis that bidding behavior is 
identical across auction type and positive and 
negative induced values by estimating 
 
                                                                                    
15 To guarantee comparability across auctions, we transform the bid-
induced value data by using the profit function from each of the auction 
mechanisms. The profit function transformation sets a floor on possible 
earnings of the winner. For the winner, the price (compensation) can be 
at most (least) one cent less (more) than his bid. As the divergence be-
tween price (compensation) and bid increases, potential earnings are 
also increasing. Our normalization of the data leads to a sharp interpre-
tation. If the value function is negative, regardless of auction type the 
person has a range of market prices (or compensations) that yield him 
negative profits. If the value function is positive, regardless of auction 
type a range of market prices (or compensations) exists in which he 
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δ =α+φ +β +β ×
+β × +β × ×
+β × × +β ×
×× + + ϕ + ε
 
 
where Bidit, INit, Negit, Negit
 × INit, ui, ϕt, and εit 
are the same as in equation (1). Dit is a dummy 
variable: if individual i participated in the WTA 
auction in round t,  Dit = 1; otherwise, 0. The 
variables Dit × Negit, Dit × INit, and Negit × Dit × 
INit are interaction terms and allow slope and 
intercept changes across auction and bidder type 
(positive and negative). Based on theory, we 
expect all slope and intercept coefficients to be 
statistically zero (see Figure 1). The GLS estimated 
equation with two-way random effects is 
 
  δit =  -0.43 + 0.02 × INit + 0.46 × Dit + 0.97 
              (0.36)      (0.12)                 (0.43)              (0.16) 
  × Dit × INit + 0.59 × Negit   + 0.18 × Dit 
                                         (0.51)                     (0.71) 
  × Negit + 0.53 × Negit × INit – 0.87 
                               (0.16)                                (0.23) 
  × Negit × Dit × INit , 
 
where standard errors are in parentheses. 
  Table 5 presents the Wald statistics for the 
hypotheses tests. From the test statistics, only bid- 142    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics on Bidding Behavior (uninformed) 
WTA  WTP 











0.28  t = -3.50 
p < 0.001 





0.09  t = -6.89 
p < 0.001 





0.72  t = -2.47 
p = 0.02 





0.62  t = -3.92 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
2.9




0.15  t = -6.17 







0.87  t = -3.58 
p < 0.001 





0.58  t = -0.40 
p = 0.70 
p = 0.05 
1.3




0.42  t = -2.73 







0.17  t = -1.24 
p = 0.22 





0.30  t = 0.13 
p = 0.89 





0.04  t = -0.27 
p = 0.80 





0.93  t = 2.45 
p = 0.02 





1.12  t = 1.84 
p = 0.08 





0.74  t = 2.57 
p = 0.01 





1.35  t = 2.72 
p = 0.01 





3.05  t = 3.96 
p < 0.001 





1.46  t = 3.71 
p < 0.001 





3.27  t = -4.05 
p < 0.001 
p = 0.05 
* Deviations are measured as the mean difference of the bids from the optimal bidding strategy 
** Each subject faced each induced value once in each auction. We pair the observations by subject and perform a Wilcoxen 
match paired signs rank test.   
† We assume unequal variances and test deviations from optimal strategies. 
†† Sample size was 40 for these induced values, 20 otherwise. 
 
 
ding behavior for the positive-value WTP auction 
statistically conforms to theory—we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of zero intercept and zero 
slope. But for the negative-value WTP auction 
and both the positive- and negative-value WTA 
auction, we reject the null hypothesis at the 1 per-
cent significance level. These conditional results 





Figure 1. Forecasted Expected Profit Floor—Uninformed 




WTP auction, aggressive bidding occurred for 
negative value, whereas positive value bids were 
nearly demand-revealing. In the WTA auction, 
behavior depended on the sign of the induced val-
ue. For negative values, bidding behavior is simi-
lar to the WTP behavior—bidders bid aggres-
sively, risking negative profits (W = 2.04, p-value 
= 0.64). But for positive values, bidding behavior 
differed from anything observed previously. Now 
people bid conservatively, apparently running 
from the possibility of negative profits—i.e., the 
expected profit floor was statistically different at 
the 1 percent level.
16 
                                                                                    
16 Subjects could have been underbidding strategically, seeking excess 
rents by driving up market compensation. Such a strategy would re-
quire the group to cooperate tacitly. Possible evidence of tacit collusion 
would be on-margin bids converging to market price over time. An 
analysis of variance comparing bids by induced value across time pro-  
  Two competing explanations can be put forth to 
help explain this pattern of bidding in the WTA 
auction, and its deviation from the WTP bidding. 
First, people could be bidding strategically, at-
tempting to collude with other subjects through 
tacit communication—moving towards the mar-
ket compensation (Parkhurst, Shogren, and Dick-
inson 2004, Sherstyuk 1999); or people may have 
auction-specific self-serving biases (Plott and 
Zeiler 2005); or the behavior may be a result of 
off-margin bidding (Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler 
2001, Shogren et al. 2001). In WTP auctions, the 
_________________________________________________________ 
vides no evidence of tacit collusion. Alternatively, the evidence sup-
ports the movement of bids towards the optimal bid with additional 
rounds. With additional experience, subjects were learning to bid their 
dominant strategy. However, we do note that statistical tests on price 
show significant differences between market price and the comparable 
market compensation (see Table 6). Market compensation was set at a 
larger value than expected. 144    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 5. Tests of Joint Hypotheses 
INDUCED VALUES  WTP AUCTION 
  Dependent = δ 
Intercept = 0, Slope = 0 
All 
2
2 49.24, χ=  p-value < 0.01 
Positive 
2
2 2.70, χ=  p-value = 0.26 
Negative 
2
2 54.99, χ=  p-value < 0.01 
INDUCED VALUES  WTA AUCTION  
  Dependent = δ 
Intercept = 0, Slope = 0 
All 
2
2 328.81, χ=  p-value < 0.01 
Positive 
2
2 166.91, χ=  p-value < 0.01 
Negative 
2
2 50.98, χ=  p-value < 0.01 
Note: Hypotheses tests for all, positive, and negative induced 




optimal bidding strategy is to bid one’s induced 
value. In contrast, the optimal strategy in the 
WTA auctions is to bid (-1) times one’s induced 
value. Although the two strategies seem straight-
forward in theory, the decision costs might be sig-
nificant for people in the lab (Irwin et al. 1998), 
which is consistent with bounded rationality argu-
ments made in other experimental contexts (Lusk 
and Hudson 2004). We now explore these two 





One approach to investigating the cognitive bur-
den of the optimal strategies of the two auctions is 
to run an additional treatment in which subjects 
are told the optimal strategy for the auction.
18 
Comparisons can be made between treatments—
subjects are informed of the optimal strategy rel-
ative to when they are uninformed. If bidding 
behavior does not differ between treatments, then 
strategic bidding likely explains our observed 
                                                                                    
17 Performing nonparametric tests which disentangle these two expla-
nations by separating the data into four subsamples—WTA(+), WTA(-), 
WTP(+), and WTP(-)—and testing two indicators of behavior—the 
percentage of bids with the incorrect sign, and the percentage of bids in 
the zero intervals—indicates that bidding behavior was not consistent 
across subsamples and warrants further investigation. The nonparame-
tric test results and data description are available upon request from the 
authors. 
18 Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2004) note that explaining the opti-
mal strategy to students is less effective than “techniques that allow 
them to learn on their own.” 
bidding behavior in the WTA auction. If bidding 
behavior changes between the informed and unin-
formed treatments, support is extended to the 
hypothesis of cognitive burden. If bidding beha-
vior differs between the informed and uninformed 
treatments but bidding differences persist between 
the informed WTA and informed WTP treat-
ments, then a hybrid explanation of cognitive bur-
den and strategic bidding—each explaining a por-
tion of the differences in aggregate bidding beha-
vior—is appropriate. 
  We first compare bidding behavior in the in-
formed and uninformed treatments for each auc-
tion type. We estimate equation (4) using a two-
way random effects model: 
 
(4) bidit = α + φINit + β1 × OPTit + β2  
  × OPTit × INit + β3 × Negit + β4 × OPTit  
  × Negit  + β5 × Negit × INit + β6 × Negit  
  × OPTit × INit + ui + ϕt + εit , 
 
where Bidit, INit, Negit, Negit × INit, ui, ϕt, and εit 
are the same as in equation (2). OPTit is a dummy 
variable: if individual i participated in the in-
formed auction treatment in round t, OPTit = 1; 
otherwise, 0. The variables OPTit × Negit, OPTit × 
INit, and Negit × OPTit × INit are interaction terms 
and allow slope and intercept changes across treat-
ment and positive and negative induced values. If 
bidding behavior is independent of whether an in-
dividual is informed or not informed of the domi-
nant strategy, we expect all estimated slope and 
intercept coefficients for controls that include 
OPT to be statistically zero. The GLS estimated 
equation with two-way random effects for the 
WTP auction is 
 
 bidit =  0.43 + 0.98 × INit – 0.39 × OPTit  
                   (0.29)      (0.09)                (0.41) 
  + 0.05 × OPTit × INit – 0.40 × Negit  
                       (0.12)                                 (0.38) 
  + 0.24 × OPTit × Negit – 0.48 × Negit 
                      (0.53)                                    (0.12) 
  × INit + 0.16 × Negit × OPTit × INit , 
                                  (0.17) 
 
where standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Overall, a joint test on all OPT and OPT inter-
active terms being equal to zero reveals a signifi-Shogren, Parkhurst, and Hudson  Experimental Economics and the Environment   145 
 
 
cant difference between the bidding behavior of 
subjects in the informed treatment relative to the 
uninformed treatment (p-value < 0.01). For posi-
tive induced values, we see that no statistical dif-
ference exists (p-value = 0.61) between WTP bid-
ding behavior of informed relative to uninformed 
subjects. However, a statistical difference is evi-
denced in WTP bids over negative induced values 
for informed relative to uninformed participants 
(p-value = 0.01). Informing subjects of their do-
minant strategy had no effect on subjects’ bidding 
behavior over positive induced values (on-margin 
bidders), but did affect the subjects’ bids for neg-
ative induced values (off-margin bidders). For 
negative induced values, subjects informed of the 
dominant strategy came closer to bidding truth-
fully than did uninformed subjects, but did not bid 
in a manner that was perfectly demand-revealing. 
  Estimating equation (4) for the WTA sample 
yields the following results: 
 
 bidit =  -0.05 + 0.03 × INit – 0.33 × OPTit 
                      (0.36)      (0.12)                 (0.47) 
   –  0.62 × OPTit × INit + 0.84 × Negit 
                       (0.17)                                  (0.53) 
   –  0.37  × OPTit × Negit – 0.37 × Negit 
                        (0.73)                                   (0.17) 
   × INit + 0.25 × Negit × OPTit × INit . 
                   (0.24)  
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Using a Wald 
test, we reject the joint hypothesis of no differ-
ence between bidding behavior of informed ver-
sus uninformed subjects at the 1 percent signify-
cance level (p-value < 0.001). For positive in-
duced values, a statistical difference between in-
formed and uninformed WTA bidding behavior is 
witnessed (p-value < 0.01). Positive induced 
value bidders informed of the dominant strategy 
in the WTA auction bid (= -0.38 – 0.59 × INit) 
closer to theoretical prediction of intercept 0, 
slope = -1, than do their uninformed counterparts 
(= -0.05 + 0.03 × INit). We see that in negative 
induced value space, bidding behavior is also 
statistically different for the informed (= 0.09 – 
0.71 × INit) relative to the uninformed (= 0.79 – 
0.34 × INit) WTA subjects (p-value = 0.04). 
  We capture the conclusions from the above 
regressions in Figures 2a and 2b. We see that, 
mapping the predicted bid lines for WTP and 
WTA auctions for optimal strategy for informed 
and uninformed subjects, bidding behavior comes 
closer to theoretical predictions for informed 
subjects than for uninformed subjects in the WTA 
auction, but informed WTA bidding behavior still 
falls short of being demand-revealing. Also, in-
formed bidding behavior in the WTP auction for 
negative induced values is not demand-revealing, 
but improves on the bidding behavior of unin-
formed subjects. For positive induced values, 
both informed and uninformed subjects are de-
mand-revealing. 
   We now estimate equation (3) for the informed 
WTA bidding behavior relative to the informed 
WTP bidding behavior to address the following 
question: Does bidding behavior in negative and 
positive induced value space differ across auction 
types for informed subjects? Recall that we nor-
malize the data by calculating the expected profit 
floor [equation (2)]. The estimated two-way ran-
dom effects regression equation for the informed 
data is 
 
  δit =  -0.04 – 0.02 × INit – 0.26 × Dit  
     (0.27)     (0.10)               (0.36) 
   +  0.40 × Dit × INit + 0.15 × Negit  
        (0.14)                           (0.14) 
   + 0.12 × Dit × Negit + 0.31 × Negit 
        (0.60)                             (0.14) 
   × INit – 0.43 × Negit × Dit × INit . 
                                (0.20) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. From the re-
gression results, we see that the regression line for 
the positive induced value WTP profit floor is as 
expected—zero intercept and zero slope. For neg-
ative induced values, the estimated WTP regres-
sion line is steeper than expected, with a slope of 
0.29. The regression lines also have non-zero 
slopes for both positive and negative WTA re-
gression lines—0.38 and 0.26. 
  We now answer the question of interest: Does 
bidding behavior differ across auction types for 
informed subjects? Using a Wald test we reject 
the null hypothesis of identical bidding behavior 
between informed WTP and informed WTA over 
all induced values (p-value < 0.01). We also re-
ject the null hypothesis of identical bidding beha-
vior between informed WTA and WTP treatments 
for positive induced values (p-value < 0.01). In-
formed subjects in the WTA auction bid conser-




Figure 2a. Bid Lines—Uninformed (UN) versus Informed (I) Willingness to Accept 
Note: Predicted bidding behavior is represented by a 45 percent line with slope -1 for WTA. Lines with square identifiers repre-
sent informed subjects, and hourglass identifiers represent uninformed subjects. Note that bidding behavior of informed subjects 
shifts towards theoretical predictions. 
 
whereas in the WTP auction subjects’ bids are 
demand-revealing. However, for negative induced 
values, no statistical difference in bidding 
behavior emerges (p-value = 0.95). Informed sub-
jects with negative induced values bid aggressive-




We diminish the cognitive burden of discerning 
the optimal bidding strategy by informing sub-
jects of their optimal strategy and providing illu-
strative examples. And although informed sub-
jects’ bids are closer to being demand-revealing 
in aggregate, we find that the differences in bid-
ding behavior that emerged in the uninformed 
treatment persisted in the informed treatment. 
Reducing the cognitive burden mitigated the dif-
ferences in on-margin bidding behavior, but did 
not alleviate them. On-margin (positive induced 
values) subjects in the WTA auction tended to bid 
conservatively relative to the WTP auction, re-
gardless of whether they were informed or unin-
formed of the optimal strategy. Informed and un-
informed off-margin (negative induced values) bid-
ders bid aggressively in both auctions, though the 
bids of informed subjects were closer to being de-
mand-revealing. Cognitive burden explains some 
of the variation in bidding behavior between auc-
tion types; however, it does not explain all the 
variation. 
  From examining Figures 1, 2a, and 2b, one 
might surmise that deviations from optimal bids 
are a manifestation of loss aversion. Loss aver-
sion implies that a person is willing to pay a pre-
mium to avoid a certain loss. However, in a Vick-
rey auction a subject who plays his dominant 
strategy avoids all possibility of incurring a loss. 
For loss aversion to have explanatory power in 
this situation, it must be that negative values are 
perceived as a loss, while positive values are seen 
as a gain.
19 We take great care in the instructions 




A. If the market compensation is positive, say $x.yz = 
$400, 
                                                                                    
19 The typical approach of testing loss aversion in Vickrey auctions is 
to establish a reference point, X, and then ask subjects their willingness 
to pay to move from X to (X + Y), and their willingness to accept mov-
ing from X to (X – Y) [see Brookshire and Coursey (1987) and Viscusi, 
Magat, and Huber (1987)]. 





Figure 2b. Bid Lines—Uninformed (UN) versus Informed (I) Willingness to Pay 
Note: Predicted bidding behavior is represented by a 45 percent line with slope 1 for WTP. Lines with square identifiers represent 
informed subjects, and hourglass identifiers represent uninformed subjects. 
 
  then you make a positive profit if your resale value is 
greater than -$400. If your resale value equals -$300, 
then your profits equal $100 [= $400 + (-$300)] 
  then you make a negative profit if your resale value is 
less than -$400. If your resale value equals -$600, 
then your profits equal -$200 [= $400 + (-$600)]. 
 
B. If the market compensation is negative, say $x.yz = 
-$400, 
  then you make a positive profit if your resale value is 
greater than $400. If your resale value equals $500, 
then your profits equal $100 (= -$400 + $500) 
  then you make a negative profit if your resale value is 
less than $400. If your resale value equals $200, then 
your profits equal -$200 (= -$400 + $200). 
 
  Another manifestation of loss aversion is the 
endowment effect. Here, subjects endowed with a 
good must be compensated a greater value to give 
up the good than they would pay to acquire the 
same good when not endowed (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). In this experiment no 
difference in endowment occurs. A subject’s in-
duced value becomes endowed only if he wins the 
auction, regardless of auction type. If the subject 
does not win the auction, he earns zero profits for 
that round. Further, induced values and cash are 
perfect substitutes (Smith 1976), which implies 
that compensating and equivalent variation are of 
equal magnitude, which should negate the endow-
ment effect (Hanemann 1991).  
  Off-margin bidding could be another expla-
nation for differences in bidding behavior be-
tween auctions for both positive and negative 
induced values. Here, the conjecture is that in a 
kth-price uniform auction, off-margin bidding 
behavior can occur at both extremes of the distri-
bution (Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler 2001). The 
comparable observation is the bidding behavior of 
on-margin bidders (Shogren et al. 2001). To test 
this hypothesis, we use the market price and mar-
ket compensation data from Table 6 to create on- 148    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 























Mean  $2.02  $2.37  2.05 $-2.02 $-0.20  -1.78 
Variance  0.50 0.72 0.55 0.50 1.10 0.79 
Mode  1.30 3.00 1.30  -1.30 1.00  -2.90 
Median  2.00 2.55 2.00  -2.00 0.05  -1.40 
Minimum  1.30  1.00  1.00 -2.90 -2.90 -3.10 
Maximum  2.90 5.50 3.10  -1.30 1.80 0.00 
Auction  efficiency  1.00 0.72 0.86 1.00 0.42 0.70 
Rounds  1–5  1.00 0.67 0.87 1.00 0.33 0.65 




margin intervals by treatment.
21 Controlling for 
auction type we observe a significant difference 
in bidding behavior for on-margin bidders for in-
tervals greater than 1 standard deviation. On-mar-
gin bidders in the WTA auction bid conserva-
tively, foregoing profitable opportunities, whereas 
the WTP bids of the on-margin bidders are de-
mand-revealing. 
  Tacit collusion is another possible explanation 
for the conservative bids witnessed in the WTA 
auction for positive values. Positive induced 
valued subjects (projected winners) increase over-
all profits by driving up market compensation 
through conservative bidding. To work, tacit col-
lusion requires a concerted effort by all partici-
pants in the auction. A deviation from the collu-
sive outcome by one subject could trigger devia-
tions by all subjects (see Sherstyuk 1999). For 
tacit collusion to be effective, projected winners 
should win the auction, and that market compen-
sation would be greater than expected. From 
Table 7 we see that market compensation exceeds 
expected levels in both informed and uninformed 
treatments; however, market efficiency (the per-
                                                                                    
21 Market price and compensation intervals are established using the 
calculated mean and standard deviation for each treatment. At a confi-
dence interval of plus or minus 1.05 standard deviations around the 
market price and market compensation, we note statistically different 
bidding behavior (p-value = 0.03). At an interval of plus or minus 2 
standard deviations, bidding behavior for on-margin bidders is statisti-
cally different at less than the 1 percent significance level. Regression 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
centage of projected winners who win) is low at 
70 percent and 42 percent for informed and unin-
formed subjects, respectively. Also, a Fisher’s 
exact test of proportions across auction types indi-
cates that market efficiency is greater for the 
WTP auction in both the informed (p-value < 
0.01) and uninformed treatments (p-value < 0.01). 
We do not find evidence in our data to support 
tacit collusion as an explanation for the observed 
WTA bidding behavior over positive induced 
values.
22 
  One could conjecture that elicitation mechan-
ism design may evoke emotions or otherwise 
trigger mechanism-specific heuristics that influ-
ence behavior by creating a misconception or self-
serving bias—for example, an attitude of tough-
ness in bargaining environments. In auctions, 
terminology specific to a particular elicitation 
procedure—i.e., the words “buy” or “sell”—can 
create a gap between observed and optimal bid-
ding behavior, where deviations from predicted 
                                                                                    
22 Tsur (2009) suggests that the disparity between WTA and WTP is 
the result of a selectivity effect. This selectivity effect results from sub-
jects overemphasizing bad experiences in previous purchasing deci-
sions and as such reducing their WTP for a good that yields uncertain 
future benefits. On the flip side, the benefits derived from a good al-
ready in one’s possession are certain, and WTA bids are accurate on 
average (Tsur 2009). Our results, though not designed specifically to 
test the selectivity effect, do not support this conjecture. We observe an 
institutional effect as opposed to a selectivity effect. Our results 
indicate that people are more accurate in bidding their values in a WTP 
auction and tend to overbid their values in the WTA auction, which 
may stem from their inexperience and naïveté in the role of a seller in 
the market. Shogren, Parkhurst, and Hudson  Experimental Economics and the Environment   149 
 
 
















































Hausman  p-value = 0.50  p-value = 0.72  p-value = 0.27  p-value = 0.17 
Joint hypotheses of NEG = 0, NEG × IN  = 0  p-value < 0.01  p-value = 0.02  p-value =0.02  p-value =0.58 
JOINT HYPOTHESES OF THEORY CONFORMITY      
Positive  p-value = 0.42  p-value = 0.78  p-value < 0.01  p-value < 0.01 
Negative  p-value < 0.01  p-value < 0.01  p-value < 0.01  p-value < 0.01 
R
2  0.61 0.34 0.13 0.50 
N  400 400 400 400 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** represents significance at the 1 percent level, ** represents significance at the 5 per-
cent level, and * represents significance at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
bidding behavior may result from biases endo-
genous to the elicitation procedure. Plott and 
Zeiler (2005) note that biases (or misconceptions) 
in bidding behavior may result from “simply be-
ing in a situation that calls for selling behavior.” 
Further, people have more experience as buyers 
than sellers. This suggests that mechanism-in-
duced biases could differ for WTA auctions rela-
tive to WTP auctions. These biases can be re-
moved with proper controls such as anonymity, 
elicitation mechanism, practice, and training (Plott 
and Zeiler 2005). In this set of experiments, 
telling bidders the optimal strategy and allowing 
them to assess that strategy over consecutive 
rounds and to adjust their bidding behavior, re-
duces the mechanism-induced biases with mi-
nimal risk of implanting the researchers’ prefe-
rences on the auction participants’ preference 
map.
23 
                                                                                    
23 Sudgen (2009) illuminates one issue that could arise when instruct-
ing experiment subjects of optimal strategies. The researcher could im-
plant his preferences (and perhaps the preferences he wishes to ob-
serve) in the subjects’ decisions. Subjects can be influenced by the em-
phasis placed on different words. The only difference between our in-
formed and uninformed treatments was the inclusion of the optimal 
strategy, three examples at the end of the instructions, and one open-
ended question on the quiz. All quiz questions were answered prior to 
the initiation of the paid rounds. One could argue that “soft paternal-  
Conclusion 
 
Over the last decade, the experimental mindset 
has thrived within resource and environmental 
economics. The desire to understand policy ques-
tions that stretch the limits of theory and empiri-
cal analysis finds a natural home in lab and field 
work that stresses the need to balance control and 
context. Given the controversial nature of many 
environmental programs and policy, researchers 
also must consider how to design rules and elicit 
values given both intrinsic and extrinsic motives. 
Herein we use the experiment method to explore 
bidding behavior for a controversial good under 
two property rights regimes. Our results suggest 
that we should use caution when employing uni-
form WTA auctions to elicit private values for 
controversial goods. People willing to pay to keep 
the status quo or who assign a negative value to 
the presumed improvement may represent them- 
 
__________________________________________________ 
ism” was incorporated into our treatments; perhaps, but if so, it was 
incorporated into both the WTA and the WTP treatments equally. We 
did not help students to reevaluate their decisions after each round, al-
though we did ensure that they calculated their profits and losses accu-
rately. We did not implement the full controls in Plott and Zeiler 
(2009), which could explain why we did not see a similar convergence 
in WTP and WTA. 150    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
selves as indifferent between the two goods. This 
misrepresentation of preferences could cause the 
researcher to overstate the social benefits that 
would result from implementation of the contro-
versial program. This result is one example of the 
experimental method—if you remain skeptical, 
rerun the experiment with a new sample; redesign 
it to better capture key variables you believe are 
missing: define new measures of success and 
failure based on economic or policy criteria. That 
is the ultimate beauty of the experimental mind-
set—new insight into asking better questions and 
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